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tHO j:)EOPLE v. .f ONES r~4 c.M 
17 -year-old Negro boy, was arrested on November 1st in Los 
Angeles and, without the aid or advice of friend or counsel, 
was thereafter questioned and brutally beaten by the police 
twice a day for three days. During this period he consistently 
urged his innocence. On the fourth day he was again cruelly 
beaten and kicked until, unable to endure the torture any 
longer, he said he "was the boy that run away" because he 
did not want any more beatings. Following such brutal 
treatment, defendant was taken to San Diego by Officer 
Blucher, who had participated to some extent in the unlawful 
inquisition in Los Angeles. Defendant was then subjected 
to further questioning by Blucher and Officer Wells at San 
Diego. Again defendant assertedly admitted his particip)1-
tion in the robbery and shooting of Toy. While both officers 
denied holding out any inducements or making any threats to 
defendant in San Diego, under all of the circumstances, the 
entire situation--shown in part by defendant's uncontra-
dicted testimony and in part by admissions of the police-is 
so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable 
with the possession of the mental freedom essential to a valid 
confession. Moreover, it does not appear that the San Diego 
police cautioned defendant that his previous confession could 
not be used against him. For want of such information de-
fendant might have concluded that he could not make his 
case worse than he already had made it and, under this im-
2ression, might have made the statements testified to by 
Officer Wells. (See Flamme v. State, 171 Wis. 501 [177 N.W. 
-,--., 596, 598]; 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, p. 998, § 601.) 
We conclude, therefore, from facts which are not in conflict, 
that the San Diego· confession was :qot voluntary and that it 
was· improperly admitted in evidence. 
The officers who secured the purported confession may have 
been sincere in their belief that defendant was guilty, and 
that the end justified the means. Law enforcement officers 
must understand, however, that a person suspected of crime 
has rights which must be respected, and that undue advan-
tage must not be taken of his fears, hopes or weakness. For 
more than a century and a half the mistreatment of persons 
in custody has been condemned by our eourts and there is no 
better settled rule than that confessions must be voluntary 
to be admissible in evidence. As stated by the Supreme Court 
in Ashcraft v. State of Tennessee (May, 1944), 322 U.S. 143 
1505 -c. 
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[64 S.Ct. 921, 927, 88 L.Ed. --1 "The Constitution of the 
United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any 
individual in an American Court by means of a coerced con-
fession. There have been, and are now, certain foreign na-
tions with governments dedieated to an opposite policy: gov-
ernments which convict individuals with testimony obtained 
by police organizations possessed of an unrestrained power 
to seize persons suspected of crimes against the state, hold 
them in secret custody and wring from them confessions by 
physical or mental torture. So long as the Constitution reo 
mains the basic law of our Republic, America will not have 
that kind of government." 
The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed. 
Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., 
and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied August 
24,1944. 
[L. A. No. 18883. In Bank. Aug. 4, 1944.] 
ERWIN P. WERNER, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR, 
Respondent. 
[1] Stipulations-Construction.-A stipulation in a disbarment 
proceeding that a transcript of the testimony at a criminal 
trial was admissible "in this proceeding" could not bc con-
strued as applicable only to a charge of conviction of crime, 
where it provided that said testimony might be read and used 
with like force and effect as if the witnesses were on the 
stand and testifying in person. 
[2a, 2b] Attorneys-Disbarment - Evidence. - The transcript of 
the evidence at a criminal trial· was admissible hearsay in a 
disbarment proceeding against an attorney accused of having 
committed the acts charged against him in the criminal prose-
cution. The requirements of Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 8, 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Stipulations, § 15; [2, 3, 5] Attorneys, 
§ 172(9); [4] Evidence, § 274; [6,10] Attorneys, § 141; [7] Evi-









612 WERNER V. STATE BAR [24 C.2d 
if applicable, were met, where it was stipuhted that T:ne State 
Bar need not establish that the witnesses were un:tvailable; 
where the parties in the two proceedings were the same, the 
attorney having been prosecuted in the name of the People, 
and the disbarment proceeding having been presented by The 
State Bar acting for the Supreme Court :md for the PeopIe; 
and where The State Bar sought to prove the same facts that 
the public prosecutor sought to prove. 
[3] Id.-Disbarment-Evidence.-In view of the fact that disbar-
ment proceedings are not governed by the rules of procedure 
governing civil or criminal litigation, the rules of evidence in 
the Code of Civil Procedure may not be applied in such pro-
ceedings if they are not necessary to insure a fair hearing. 
[4] Evidence-Hearsay-Evidence at Former Trial.-The requJe-
ment of Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, Bubd. 8, that the parties ~nd 
subject matter be the same, as a condition for use of testimony 
given in a former action, is designed to make certain that the 
cross-examination in the first proceeding can serve as well in 
the second. 
[5a-5c] Attorneys-Disbarment-Evidence.-In a disbarment pro-
ceeding, the evidence established thut the attorncy offered to 
bribe a deputy district attorney, where a person under indict-
ment for theft described an offer to bribe said official by the 
accused attorney, ncting through his wife who repeated the 
offer severnl times; where this testimony, although impeached, 
'VIlS corroborated by the district attorney's employees who 
were hidden at said person's home; and where the testimony 
of these witnesses showed that the attorney's wife, with his 
knowledge, spoke of approaching the deputy district attorney, 
and of a charge of a definite sum of money in that connection. 
[6] Id.-Disbarment-Acts Involving Moral Turpitude.-An offer 
to bribe a dl'puty district attorney made by an attorney, acting 
through his wife, is an act of moral turpitude, whether or not 
there was any intention to carry out said offer. 
[7] Evidence - Hearsay - What Constitutes. - The hearsay rule 
does not forbid the introduction of evidence that a statement 
has been made when the making of the statement is significant 
irrespective of the truth or falsity of its content. 
[8] Attorneys - Disbarment - Review - Evidence - Bure.~n of 
Proof.-In a proceeding to review a recommendation of dis-
barment of an attorney, the findings of The State Bar must be 
[4J See 10 Cal.Jur. 1128; 20 Am.Jur. 582. 
[6J Sec 9 Cal.Jur. Ten-year Supp. ·123, 5 Am.Jur. 428. 
[7J See 10 Cal.Jur. 1035; 20 Am.Jur. 403. 
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given great weight, and the burden is on the attorney to show 
that a particular finding is clearly erroneous or unsupported 
in the record. 
[9] Id.-Disbarment-Hearing-Findings.-In a disbarment pro-
ceeding, where a notice to show cause stat.ed that the attorney 
offered to bribe a deputy district attorney, and had attempted 
to defraud a person accused of theft by seeking to obtain 
money from him on the false representation that it would be 
used to bribe said official, a finding of the Board of Governors 
that the nttorney had planned with his wife to obtain a sum 
of money from the accused thief and had represented to him 
that It part of snid sum would be used for having the criminal 
charge dismissed, while not following the language of the 
nc.)tice, was supported by the evidence and showed a plan to 
defraud and an offer to bribe a public official. 
[10] Id.-Disbarment-Acts Involving Moral Turpitude.-An at-
torney who proposed to a person accused of theft that the 
htter give him n sum of money on the represent.ation that it 
would be used to bribe a deputy district attorney in connection 
with the theft charge, committed acts involving moral turpi-
tude that constitute a cause for disbarment, whether or not 
the attorney intended to use the money to bribe a public 
offiecr or whether he intended to secure it for himself. 
PROCEEDING to review n recommendation of disbarment. 
Petitioner disbarred. 
Mark L. Herron for Petitioner. 
A. W. Ashburn and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The Board of Governors of The State Bar 
of California has recommended that petitioner be disbarred 
on the ground that in 1937 he proposed to William McNeil 
that the latter give him $2,500 for the purpose of bribing 
William E. Simpson, a Deputy District Attorney of Los An-
geles County. The ensuing transaction led to petitioner's in-
dictment or attempted grand theft, and he was tried three 
times. On the first trial the jury disagreed; on the second the 
verdict was guilty, but the judgment was reversed in the Dis-
trict Court of Appr.al (People v. Werner, 29 Cal.App.2d 126 
[84 P.2d 168]) ; on the third, petitioner was again convicted, 
but the judgment was reversed in this court. (People v. Wer-
ner, 16 Ca1.2d 16 [105 P.2d 927].) While petitioner's appeal 
I; 
i: 
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was pending in thi~ court, The State Bar instituted proceed-
ings against him, charging him with having been convicted of 
a felony. After the conviction was reverscd, the notice to show 
cause was amended to charge that petitioner made the offer 
to McNeil with the intention of defrauding him. The local 
committee found that petitioner committed the acts charged. 
The Board of Governors found that petitioner offered to usa 
the fundS he solicited to obtain the illegal dismissal of a chnrge 
against McNeil, and that he made the offer with the intention 
of defrauding McNeil. The only evidence introduced bcfore 
The State Bar was the record of the third trial. Early in the 
course of the proceeding, petitioner stipulated that "the testi-
mony as transcribed by the reporter in the ease of The People 
of the State of California versus Erwin P. Werner ... J11~y 
be read and used in this proc0cding with like foree anc.l ('[oct 
as if the witnesses whose testimony as found in sllid transcript 
were on the stand aud testifying in person, Sll bject to all le~al 
objections either as to form or as to substance." Petitioner 
concedes that if this stipulation is applicable, it is irrevocable, 
and that the evidence was propcrly admitted, but contends 
that the stipulation became inapplicable because the notice 
was amended to charge specific acts instead of conviction of 
a felony and that his objection to the admission of the tran-
script of the criminal trial should have been sustained. 
[1] The stipulation provides that the transcript is admis-
sible "in this proceeding." When it was made, it was reason-
able to expect that the proceeding would involve precisely the 
type of amendment made. Since The State Bar proceeding' 
was stayed pending outcome of petitioner's appeal, and sinct! 
that outcome was unknown, the proceeding could Dot be con-
tinued, in the event of a reversal, without an amendment of 
the notice to make it charge the commission of certain acts 
involved in the criminal trial rather than conviction at that 
trial. The stipulation could hardly be construed as applicable 
only to a charge of conviction of crime without becoming 
meaningless, for it provides for the reading of the testimony 
of witnesses, and there would be no reason for reading such 
testimony merely to establish conviction of a crime. 
[2a] Even if the stipulation were regarded as inapplicable, 
this evidence was admissible. The transcript of the e, idcllce 
at the criminal trial was admissible hearsa'y in the State Bar 
Aug. 1944] WERNER 'V. STATE BAR 
[24 C.2d 611] 
615 
proeeeding. Such hearsay is admissible in civil pr~cel'dings if 
it is "Thc testimony of a witness deceased, or out of the juris-
uiction, or unable to testify, given in a former action between 
the same parties, relating to the same matter." (C6de Civ, 
Proc., § 1870, sulJd. 8.) In criminal proceedings the rulegov-
erning the testimony of witnesses other than defendant is 
contained in Penal Code, seetion 686, which provides that· 
the tpstimony of a witness deceased, insane, out of the juric;-
diction, or who cannot be discovered, given at a previous trial 
of the action, may be admitted. (See People v. Bird, 132 
Cal. 261 [64 P. 259].) Petitioner, relying on section 1870, 
subdivision 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure, contends that 
the conditions imposed therein are not met. [3} It has 
been repeatedly held, however, that disbarment proceedings 
are not governed by the rules of procedure governing Civil 
or criminal litigation. (Johnson v. State Bar, 4 Ca1.2d7·J.l 
[52 P.~d 928] ; Herron v. State B(~r, 212 CRI. 1:.16 [298 1', 
474]; Matter IIf Danfod, 157 Cal. 4::?5, 430 [108 P. 322]; 
In re Vaughan, 189 CaL 491 [209 P. 353, 24 .A.L.R. 858].) 
There is no legislative requirement, therefore, that the rules 
of evidence in the Code of Civil Procedure be applied in dis-
barment proceedings, although they are frequently invoked 
to insure a fair hearing. (See in re Richardson, 209 Cal. 
492 [288 P. 669] ; In re Lacy 234 Mo.App. 71 [112 S.W.2d 
594] ; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140 [67 A. 497, 10 Ann. Cas. 
539] ; 5 Wigmore on Evidence (3d ed. 19-10), § 1388, p. 103.) 
There is no reason for invoking them, however, if they are not 
necessary to serve that purpose. 
Hearsay evidence is often excluded to insure that all evi-
dence may be tested by cross-examination (Englebretson v. 
Ind1tstrjal etc. Com., 170 Cal. 793 [151 P. 421], see 5 Wig-
more or Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1362.) On three successive 
trials petitioner had the opportunity to cross-examine the 
witnesses against him and the record shows that he fully exer-
cised the right at the last trial so that there is little likelihood 
that any significant weakness in the testimony of the witnesfles 
was overlookcd. On essentially similar facts, in In re Durant, 
80 Conn. 140 [67 A. 497, 10 Ann.Cas. 539], and In re Lacy, 
234l\Io.App.71 [112 S.W.2d 594], it was held that the record 
of a previous trial wal;' admissible in a disbarment proceeding, 
and it was noted that when the court thus exercises its pow('r 
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no part, there is no need to adhere strictly to rules made pri-
marily to govern jury trials. 
[2b] In any event the requirements of section 1870, sub-
division 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which petitioner 
contends is applicable to this proceeding, havc bcen met. 
That section imposes three conditions upon the use of testi-
mony given in a former action: the witnesses must be unavail-
able, the parties must be the same, and the subject matter of 
the proceedings must be the same. It was stipulated that The 
State Bar need not establish that the witnesses were unavail-
able. Petitioner was prosecuted in the name of the People 
of California, and the trial was conducted by attorneys repre-
senting the People. In the present proceeding the case against ( 
petitioner is presented by The State Bar, acting as the arm of 
this court and also representing the People of the State. In 
reality the parties are the same. Petitioner's contention that 
the subject matter is not the same is based on the fact that 
this proceeding is for disbarment, whereas the earlier case 
was a criminal prosecution. The Legislature, however, aware 
that a disbarHlcnt proceeding is different from any other type 
of action, could hardly have intended to preclude the use of 
the transcript of an earlier proceeding in a proceeding for 
disbarment. The State Bar seeks to prove the same facts that 
the public prosecutor sought to prove so that both proceed-
ings actually do concern the same matter. (Fredericks v. 
Judah, 73 Cal. 604 [15 P. 305] ; McAlister v. Dungan, 108 
Cal.App. 185 [291 P. 419].) [4] The requirement that 
parties and subject matter be the same is designed to make 
certain that the cross-examination in the first proceeding can 
serve as well in the second. (Lyon v. Rhode Island Co., 38 
R.I. 252 [94 A. 893, L.R.A. 1916A 983] ; 5 Wigmore on Evi-
dence (1940), § 1388, p. 95.) Since this purpose is fulfilled, 
the transcript was properly admitted. Moreover, petitioner 
was free to introduce additional eVIdence in his own behalf 
but did not avail himself of this right. 
[5a] Petitioner contends that this evidence, even if ad-
missible, does not establish that he offered to bribe the deputy 
district attorney. McNeil was under indictment for grand 
theft because of certain transactions in securities with a Mrs. 
Bovell. Petitioner had served as his attorney in similar situ-
ations until they had a disagreement over fees. Some time 
after the commencement of this prosecution against McNeil, 
Aug. 1944) WERNER V. STATE :BAR 
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however, petitioner attempted to communicate with him, call-
ing on McNeil's attorney in the litigation over the fee as well 
as on his attorney in the Bovell matter. McNeil, while at 
first unwilling to see him, finally telegraphed petitioner that 
he get in touch with him. On the 19th or 20th of August, 
1937, petitioner called on McNeil, and in the following week 
several conferences took place between petitioner, McNeil, 
and petitioner's wife. Afterthe first visit by petitioner, when 
McNeil allegedly offered to bribe Simpson, McNeil communi-
cated with the district attorney's office. A dictaphone was 
placed in McNeil's home and listeners were posted in his base-
ment. 
McNeil was the principal witness against petitioner. He 
testified that petitioner said, when he first called on August 
19th or 20th, that "Mrs. Werner had some good ideas and 
that he had Eome good ideas as to how to handle it in the Dis-
trict Attorney's office ... and he said that Mrs. Werner was 
very well acquainted with Mr. Simpson, the Chief Deputy 
District Attorney there, and that for about $2,500 he could 
get Mr. Simpson to, as he said, kick this case out of the Dis-
trict Attorney's Office; in other words, he could square it up, 
but it would be necessary, naturally, to satisfy Mrs. Bovell. 
... " McNeil testified that on the same occasion petitioner 
stated "that he was satisfied that he could take care of it in 
the District Attorney's Office, by paying Mr. Simpson $2,500, 
and spreading some money around the police department. 
... " Petitioner and his wife called on McNeil the following 
Monday, and after a brief conversation petitioner went up-
stairs. McNeil testified that meanwhile he and Mrs. Werner 
discussed the arrangements to be made with the district at-
torney's office, and that "She said anything that was to be 
handled in the settlement of this matter in the District Attor-
ney's Office, she would handle, herself; and if she didn't get 
to handle the money she would not have anything to do with 
it, because any time theretofore when they had any cases 
of this kind, if Pete got hold of the money she never got any 
of it, and that she could have this case dismissed in the Dis-
trict Attorney's Office by paying to Bill Simpson, the Chief 
Deputy District Attorney, $2,500." McNeil then testified 
that subsequently petitioner returned to the room and the 
conversation devolved upon possible arrangements with Mrs. 
'I 
I 
618 WERNER V. f3TATE ~AR tMC.M 
Bovell. Thereafter petitioner went out to a drugstore, and 
Juring his absence discussion of the arrangements with the 
district attorney's office was resumed, Mrs. Werner again in-
sisting that she handle the money and direct the arrange-
ments. On the following Thursday when the three met again 
there was a dispute between petitioner and McNeil as to the 
funds required for settling the case. Petitioner testified that 
" ... he [McNeil] said, 'I will put up $10,000 to clear up 
your situation, Bergman and Mrs. BoveU, and give up the 
equity in the Crenshaw house and the furniture and these two 
houses in Culver City as soon as you can come and tell me 
that the District .Attorney will dismiss my case .. .''' Peti-
tioner replied, "You want me to settle this case for you on ( 
jawbone," but "It can't be done." According to McNeil it 
was then arranged that Mrs. Werner visit McNeil's house 
alone, but there is some dispute as to petitioner's knowledge 
of this arrangement. In any event, on Friday afternoon Mrs. 
Werner called and indicated that arrangements with Simpson 
had been completed, and again warned that she must handle 
the cash and the arrangements with the district attorney's 
office. On Friday evening petitioner and Mrs. Werner re-
turned to McNeil's house. After petitioner was told that the 
cash for all the arrangements would be turned over Saturday, 
McNeil turned over to Mrs. Werner, while petitioner was out, 
an envelope supposedly containing the cash. Actually it con-
tained some paper and one dollar bills. Petitioner and Mrs. 
Werner were arrested as they left the house. 
The testimony of McNeil thus describes an offer to bribe 
Simpson by petitioner, acting through Mrs. Werner who re-
peated the offer several times. The fraudulence of such an 
offer is revealed by Simpson's testimony that he did not know 
Mrs. Werner, although he had met her once, and that he was 
absent from Los Angeles at the time the offer was made. 
[6] In any event, the making of such an offer, whether or 
not there was any intention to carry it out, is an act of moral 
turpitUde. 
[5b] McNeil's own testimony was impeached, for it was 
shown that he was hostile to petitioner, that he had been con-
victed of a felony, and that he had made various inconsistent 
statements as to the time and substance of some of the conver-
sations described. His testimony, however, was corroborated 
by the employees of the district attorney who had been posted 
Aug. 1944] WERNER v. STATE BAR 
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in the cellar, Miss Ruthe Wood, a secretary who took notes 
of the conversations in shorthand, and Mr. Frank T. Allen, 
an investigator who took some longhand notes. 
Miss Wood's notes record that at the Wednesday confer-
ence, while petitioner was absent, Mrs. Werner said, "I want 
you before we leave here to make Erwin promise that he will 
talk with me and we will agree with you on everything that is 
to be done, because what Pete will do-and I want you not 
to let him do is have any contact with the District Attorney's 
office ... I wouldn't go up there. I see Mr. Shnpson-very 
old friend." Werner insisted on having control of the funds, 
saying, "I want you to pay me the money that is a part of this 
frame-up. " Mr. Allen's notes likewise show that Mrs. Wer-
ner stated, "I will see Mr. Simpson; very old friend," and 
that she insisted on control of the funds. 
Miss Wood's notes record further that on petitioner's re-
turn McNeil said to petitioner, "Helen and I had a talk 
while you were out ... Helen is cocksure and you are and I am 
that this Bovell matter will be settled. This house and fur-
niture plus $5,000. I don't care if you pay Bergman and the 
Police Department. As quick as we can all arrive at just 
what is necessary and the quicker I can hand it over-I don't 
want a receipt-it is a deal between three people ... I am 
willing to go on that and I am willing to split another $5,000. 
There is no use to go ahead and hire a lawyer and go to trial 
and not know what the outeome is ... I will let Helen and 
you work out the details. I believe it would be best that this 
thing can be worked out under her direction of what she has 
in mind ... If Helen and you can come out at noon tomorrow 
and tell me that is all set and another $5,000 on the outside. 
. . ." Mrs. Werner: "I am not going to take you for one 
thing so far as my little end of it goes." McNeil: "You come 
out and tell me what you can do, it is worth something like 
that." Mrs. Werner; "I want to see one person and I can do 
that in the morning. They won't know what I want." 
Miss Wood and Mr. Allen were away at the time of the 
Thursday conversation, but took notes again on Friday after-
noon when Mrs. Werner appeared alone. Miss Wood's notes 
show that Mrs. Werner told McNeil that Simpson would in-
struct Mr. Arterberry, the deputy in charge of the McNeil 
case, to dismiss it; and that the following conversation oc-
620 WERNER V. STATE BAR [24 C.2d 
curred: McNeil: "The house, furniture and a deed to those 
houses out there and $10,000." Mrs. Werner: "That is Bov-
shover (Mrs. Bovell's manager.)" McNeil:" 'rhe other to 
slide through D . .A. office." Mrs. Werner: "This one usually 
charges $2,500." 
Miss Wood testified that there was a conversation on Fri-
day night between petitioner, McNeil, and Mrs. Werner as 
follows: McNeil: ".About the other part. I am going to let 
Helen handle the money. I want you to be sure and be down 
here by the 12th .... This case is going to come up the 27th 
and I want it booted out of the District .Attorney's office. I 
suggest this: Two fingers in the pie is a bad thing. If you 
are going to handle the District Attorney's end of it, if you 
want Pete to come in, he comes in, but not unless you want it. 
Is that right Pete?" . Werner: "Yes." McNeil: "Pete han-
dles the other end; you handle the District Attorney's office. 
Pete does only as you tell him and if it goes wrong,· you are 
the one that gummed it up, Helcn." Mrs. Werner: "I won't 
gum it up. 1 have never gotten in a mess up there on any-
thing I have tried." The testimony of these witnesses shows 
that Mrs. Werner spoke of approaching Simpson and of a 
charge of $2,500 in that connection, and that petitioner was 
aware that his wife was to approach the office of the district 
attorney. 
The fact that all references to Simpson occurred while 
petitioner was absent may be attributed to Mrs. Werner's 
desire to retain control of the funds, and to the likelihood that 
petitioner wished to remain in the background, having re-
cently been subjected to criminal prosecution and to suspen-
sion proceedings by The State Bar. (See Werner v. The State 
Bar, 13 Ca1.2d 666 [91 P.2d 881].) There was evidence that 
petitioner had previous experience with dictaphones, and some 
of the conversations were carried on in tones so low that 
Allen and Miss Wood were unable to hear them. It was Mrs. 
Werner who claimed to know Simpson, and was therefore the 
logical person to plan the approach to his office. The fact 
that Mrs. Werner proposed to bribe Simpson shortly after 
she arrived with petitioner to establish means to free McNeil, 
suggests that she had been led by petitioner to believe that 
such object was contemplated in the negotiations. There is 
additional corroboration of McNeil's testimony in the testi-
mony of Mrs. Schapiro, McNeil's attorney in the litigation 
Aug. 1944] WERNER V. STATE BAR 
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over fees, that petitioner told her when trying to communi-
cate with McNeil, "You know I can have that case of the 
People against McNeil dismissed," and by the testimony of 
Mr. Newmire, McNeil's attorney in the Bovell matter, that 
petitioner stated to him that "he was in a position to square 
the beef for Mac," and "that it was not too late yet to fix 
the matter." 
[7] It is contended by petitioner that the testimony of 
McN eil, Allen and Miss Wood, relative to the statements made 
by Mrs. Werner were hearsay as to petitioner. The hearsay 
rule, however, does not forbid the introduction of evidence 
that a statement has been made when the making of the state-
ment is significant irrespective of the truth or falsity of its 
content. (Smith v. Whittier, 95 Cal. 279, 293 [30 P. 529] ; 
see 6 Wigmore, op. cit. supra, § 1772, p. 191; see cases col-
lected at 10 Cal.J Hr., § 288, p. 1036.) Mrs. Werner's declara-
tions that she would see Simpson were not offered as evidence 
that she intended to do so, but the making of the offer lends 
credibility to McNeil's testimony that petitioner made a simi-
lar offer. 
People v. Werner, 16 Ca1.2d 216 [105 P.2d 927], does not 
establish that Mrs. Werner's statements may not be considered 
in determining whether petitioner offered to bribe Simpson. 
Petitioner was there appealing from a conviction for at-
tempted grand theft. The conviction was reversed, first, be-
cause McNeil's knowledge of the intention of petitioner and 
his wife, and his cooperation in turning over the envelope 
supposedly containing the funds made impossible either theft 
or an attempt at theft; secondly, because an attempt requires 
a direct effectual act in furtherance of the crime attempted, 
and although Mrs. Werner took the envelope she did so with-
out petitioner's knowledge with the intention of keeping the 
proceeds from him, so that her act could not be attributed 
to him. The statement that the taking by Mrs. Werner was 
"foreign to the alleged common plan" cannot be regarded 
as denying the existence of such a plan. 
Petitioner questions the accuracy of Miss Wood's notes, 
specifying various omissions, testimony that her symbols for 
"I" and "he" were much alike, and her dcpendence on the 
context of her notes and on her memory to determine their 
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in symbols led to any substantial error, and it was not essen-
, tial for Miss Wood to attempt to record everything. 
[5c] Much of the testimony indicating petitioner's guilt 
was contradicted by petitioner and Mrs. Werner. It was rea-
sonable, however, to attach greater credence to the testimony 
of McNeil, for it was corroborated by independent witnesses, 
than to that of petitioner and his wife. It is reasonable to 
suppose that the testimony of the latter would be influenced 
by the fact that they were charged with a crime of which 
they had already been found guilty. (Oaldwell v. Weiner, 
203 Cal. 543 [264 P. 1110] ; Davis v. Judson, 159 Cal. 121, 
128 [113 P. 147] ; Blanc v. Oonner, 167 Cal. 719, 723 [141 P. 
217].) 
The evidence shows unquestionably that petitioner was try-
ing to make some arrangement for the dismissal of the charge 
against McNeil. Petitioner contends, however, that the evi-
dence shows that the arrangement contemplated was restitu-
tion to Mrs. BoveU and a demonstration to Mr. Arterberry, 
the Deputy District Attorney in charge of the BoveU matter, 
of the weakness of the pro.3ecution's case. It appears from 
Miss Wood's notes and from testimony of other witnesses that 
there was much conversation on the possibility of satisfying 
Mrs. Bovell and of convincing her that she overstated the, 
case against McNeil, so that she would lose her effectiveness 
as principal witness for Arterberry. Thus Miss Wood's notes 
show that petitioner said, "I think we can put a story in her 
mind to the effect that there is nothing criminal about this; 
that Mr. Bovshover got her to say certain things that weren't 
true. " The concern of petitioner and Mrs. Werner over Mrs. 
BoveU's attitude and the presentation of a strong case to 
Arterberry is not inconsistent with the evidence that they 
proposed to bribe Simpson. The reason given for bribing 
Simpson was that Arterberry was subject to his authority. 
Miss Wood's notes record that when Mrs. Werner was asked 
by McNeil, "Do you think he [Simpson] has control of Ar-
terberry?" she replied, "Completely." Simpson, however, 
could hardly direct Arterberry to dismiss the prosecution 
without givinp. some reason; otherwise, not only Arterberry 
but Mrs. BoveU and her attorney, Mr. Bergman, would ques-
tion the dismissal. An adjustment with Mrs. BoveU and an 
explanation to Arterberry for the dismissal of the prosecution 
would be natural if Simpson were to be bribed. 
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Petitioner contends also that Mrs. Werner was not go-
ing' to bribe Simpson, but was going to hirc anothcr attor-
ncy to present the case to the district attorney's office; 
that this plan was implicit in her reference, made in peti-
tioner's presence, to seeing a certain person; and that this 
plan accounts for the $2,500 of the $10,000 that was to be 
given Mrs. Werner, otherwise unaccounted for except for the 
testimony that it was to be used for a bribe. To support this 
argument, the attorney who defended Mrs. Werner on the 
criminal trial, and who now represents petitioner, testified 
that he was to be the attorney to present the case to the dis-
trict attorney's office. This evidence was brought forward 
for the first time on the third trial and the conflict between 
it and the testimony of McNeil, Miss Wood,' and Allen was 
resolved against petitioner by the local committee and the 
Board of Governors. 
[8] It is well established that the findings of The State 
Bar must be given great weight. (Light v. State Bar, 14 Cal. 
2d 328 [94 P.2d 35] ; F1trman v. State Bar, 12 Ca1.2d 212 [83 
P.2d 12] ; Hizar v. State Bar, 20 Cal.2d 223 [124 'P.2d 812] ; 
Utz v. State Bar, 21 Cal.2d 100, 104 [130 P.2d 377] ; Petersen 
v. State Bar, 21 Ca1.2d 866, 870 [136 P.2d561].) The bur-
den is on petitioner to show that the finding is clearly errone-
ous or unsupported in the record. (Hizar v. State Bar, supra, 
at 227; Petersen v. State Bar, supra, at 870; Moura, v. State 
Bar, 18 Ca1.2d 31 [112 P.2d 629] ; Kennedy v. State Bar, 13 
Ca1.2d236, 240 [88 P.2d 920].) Petitioner has not sustained 
this burden. 
[9] Petitioner contends that the finding of the Board of 
Governors is not within the issues raised by the notice. The 
notice stated that petitioner proposed to pay a sum of money 
to William Simpson for the purpose of bribing him in con. 
~ ncction with the easc of People v. McNe~'l, and that petitioner 
attempted to defraud McNeil by seeking to obtain from him 
a sl1m of money on the false representation that it would be 
u.c;cd to bribe Simpson. The local committee found that peti-
tioner made such an offer, and that it was intended as a means 
of dc:l:r:mning McNeil. The finding of the Board of Governors 
was less explicit, declaring that petitioner entered into a plan 
with his wife to obtain $10,000 from William McNeil, and 
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be utilized for the purpose uf illegally arranging for the dis-
IIliss:"!1 of a criminal charge pending against McNeil. ... " 
While this finding does not follow the language of the notice, 
it is amply ~upported by the evidence, and shows a plan to 
defraud and an offer to bribe a public officer. The board 
also found "that as a part of said plan the respondent, with 
his wife, sought to obtain $10,000 from William McNeil with 
intent to commit grand theft of a portion of said amount." 
[10] Whether petitioner intended to use the money to bribe 
a public officer or whether he intended to secure it for him-
self, he committed acts involving moral turpitude that con-
stitute a cause for disbarment. 
It is therefore ordered that the petitioner be disbarred 
from the practice of law in California and that his n:Jme 
be struck from the roll of attorneys, this order to become ef-
fective thirty days after it is filed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
SHENK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
order of disbarment on the ground that the transcript of the 
testimony of witnesses taken on the trial of the petitioner for 
the criminal offense was admissible in evidence in the disbar-
ment proceeding pursuant to the stipulation entered into by 
the petitioner, and that the evidence supports the conclusion 
that disbarment should follow. However, I dissent from the 
determination that, aside from the stipulation, and assuming 
unavailability of the witnesses, the transcript of the testimony 
taken at the trial of the petitioner on a felony charge as to 
which there was no final jUdgment of conviction, may be 
introduced in a disbarment proceeding against him to prove 
the commission of acts of moral turpitude. In a case of con-
viction, the testimony would be unnecessary as the fact of 
conviction is ground for disbarment. In my opinion this 
court in the absence of a stipulation, should not approve the 
introduction in evidence in a disbarment proceeding of the 
transcribed testimony of witnesses taken in the trial of an 
attorney on a charge of which he was not fiu:J.lly convicted, 
to prove acts of moral turpitude, much less in a calJe, such as 
this, where the determination of the question is not a neces-
sary ground for disbarment. 
Furthermore, I am in disagreement with the statement in 
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the majority opmlOn that the rcquirements of sectiun 1870, 
subdivision 80f the Code of Civil Procedure have been met, 
in that the testimony was "given in a former action betwer.n 
the same parties, relating to the same matter." The majority 
do not come to the conclusion that the parties and subject 
matter are the same. (Cf. United States v. A.luminum Co. of 
.Am., [D.C.-N.Y.] 1 F.R.D. 48.) The opinion avoic1s the 
necessity for such a conclusion by stating in essence that the 
effect is the same; that in disbarment proceedings the law 
does not require a strict adherence to the rules of procedure 
governing civil and criminal cases, and that there is no reason 
for invoking such rules unless they are necessary to insure 
a fair hearing. This court has recognized that in hearings in 
disbarment proceedings there is a mea."ure of freedom from 
the rules of procedure applicable to the conrts. But this court 
has also adhered to the requirement that an attorney may not 
be st.ripped of his privileges except on competent and legal 
evidence. In In re Richardson, 209 Cal. 492 [21:18 P. GG:)], 
it was pointed out that it is not so much a matter of pro-
cedural rules, as it is the kind of evidence that is necessary 
and sufficient to deprive an attorney of his right to practice. 
In that decision, in holding that henrsay evidence is not com-
petent for the purpose, it was said at page 499: "Legal evi-
dence alone should be required to deprive a duly admitted 
attorney of the vitally important and valuable right to prac-
tice his profession, and to impose upon him the stigma of dis-
barment. The court can be asked in such review only to 
consider the sufficiency of legal evidence. We are of the view, 
therefore, that only legal evidence, as that tcrm is understood 
among lawyers, should receive the eOllsideration of the Board 
of Governors and committees of The State Bar in the exercise 
of the disciplinary features of the Bar Act." That view was 
followed with reliance on the Riehardson case in Masters v. 
Board of Dental Examiners, 15 Cal.App.2d 506 [59 P.2d 
827]. 
The well understood test in this state as to the admissibility 
of the testimony of witnesses taken at a previuus trial, where 
there hos been opportullity for cross-examination, is llOt the 
court's opiniun as to the adequacy of the cross-eX!lminlltlOu 
and fairness in the particular case, but is t.he identity of suh. 
ject matter and parties. In Neblett v. State Bar, 17 Ca1.2d 
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77 [109 P.2d 340J, it was noted that the differences in the 
nature of the proceedings, in the parties, and in the suhject 
matter inherent in a previous trial and in a disbarment pro-
ceeding, might greatly affect the interests and therefore the 
results produced by cross-examination of the same witnrssc.s. 
The cases supporting the majority and minority rules gov-
erning the admissibility of testimony taken in a previoul'! trial 
when the witnesses are unavailable, as an exception to the 
rule excluding hearsay, are collected in 21 Ann.Cas. page 179, 
et seq. The majority rule, prevailing in England, Canada, 
and in our federal and state courts, requires essential identity 
of the matter in iRsue and of the parties, the latter compre-
hending privies in blood, in law or in estate. The statement 
in the text of the minority rule permitting opportunity for 
cross-examination (instead of requiring identity of parties 
and subject matter), as the test of admissibility-the rule 
applied by the decision in the present case-is supported by 
the citation of a case from each of two states, Connecticut and 
Nevada. The decision adds one from the State of Missouri. 
There may be others, but it seems to me that the majority 
rule, which has been adopted in this state by statute, should 
not be disregarded in any determination of the question. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
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[1] Appeal-Supersedeas-Judgment Directing Payment of Money. 
-A judgment for costs is not a judgment directing the pay-
ment of money mentioned in Code Civ. Proc., § 942, and is 
therefore stayed by the provisions of § 949 of the same code. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Effect-Powers of Trial Court Pending Appeal.-
An appeal from a judgment and a stay of further proceed-
ings in the trial court do not deprive that court of jurisdic-
tion to settle a bill of exceptions; in such a situation the court 
ordinarily has jurisdiction, and it is its duty to take all nece!;· 
sary steps and make all necessary orders that a proper and 
correct record on appeal may be prepared. Therefore an order 
staying proceedings, while limited to proceedings on appeal, 
is within the jurisdiction of the trial court to make and en-
force. 
[3] Id.-Judgments and Orders Appealable-Special Orders Made 
After Final Judgment.-An order granting a stay of proceed-
ings, while . limited to proceedings on appeal, is not appealable 
as a special order made after final judgment within Code 
Civ. Proc., § 963, as such an order neither stays nor enforces 
the judgment-which was automatically stayed by the appeal 
itself-but serves merely to extend or continue the time for 
the preparation of the record on appeal. 
[4] Certiorari - When Writ Lies - Excess of Jurisdiction. - In 
order that relief by certiorari may be granted, there must 
have been an excess of jurisdiction by an inferior tribunal 
[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. 427; 3 Am.Jur. 195. 
[2] See 2 Cal.Jur. 180; 3 Am.Jur. 192. 
[4] See 4 Cal.Jur. 1022; 10 Am.Jur. 527. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 395; [2] Appeal 
and Error, § 384; [3] Appeal and Error, § 51; [4] Certiorari, §§ 9, 
12; (5] Motions and Orders, § 23; [6,7] Military, § 2a. 
